Lie No. 4: Bonifacio was cheated at the Tejeros elections

THE TRUTH: 

The allegation that Bonifacio was cheated at the Tejeros elections is baseless and has no truth in it.  The fact is Bonifacio lost the presidency and the vice presidency in a succession of nomination and votation and was elected eventually to the lowest position as Director of Interior, very likely,  a product of condescension, or more likely a manifestation of the kind of trust and confidence that the revolutionaries had on their leaders.  Those who were elected for the higher positions had proven themselves in battle and Bonifacio had not.

According to Aguinaldo, 

"...talagang pinaghandaan ang halalang ito sa Tejeros ng mga Magdiwang, dahilan sa ito'y lingid sa kaalaman ng mga Magdalo na noo'y kasalukuyang nakikipaglaban sa Dasmarinas at mga kanugnog. Sila ay walang kamalay-malay sa balak na pag-iisa ng puwersa ng Magdiwang-Magdalo para sa ikatatagumpay ng pakikipaglaban sa mga Kastila sa ilalim ng pamumuno ni Heneral Jose Dominguez Lachambre. Talagang itinaon nina Bonifacio at Ricarte ang petsa ng halalan dahilan sa abalang abala noon ang mga Magdalo sa pakikipaglaban kaya wawalo lamang sa kanila ang nakadalo samantalang "naroon sa teritoryo ng Magdiwang taglay ang kanilang mahigit sa isang daang tauhan nila." (Ronquillo, 29).

(Translation: "...the Magdiwangs really prepared for the Tejeros elections because the Magdalos were not aware of it being too engrossed with fighting at Dasmarinas and adjoining areas.  They did not have any inkling about the plan to unify the forces of Magdiwang-Magdalo for the success of the struggle against the Spaniards under the leadership of General Jose Dominguez Lachambre.  Bonifacio and Ricarte really set the election date at the time when the Magdalos had their hands full in the battle which explains why only eight delegates were able to attend from their group while the Magdiwangs had more than one hundred.)

Note that Bonifacio was not a stranger in Cavite.  His wife, Gregoria de Jesus, is a relative of Mariano  Alvarez, the head of the Katipunan Magdiwang council that controlled half of Cavite.  Bonifacio was also accepted into the fold by being installed as the "Haring Bayan"  of the Magdiwang council, relegating Alvarez, the traditional head, to the position of Virrey, or second in command (Ronquillo,140).

That cheating was a scheme conceived and carried out by the Magdalos to favor Aguinaldo is so fallacious judging from the following facts:  

FIRST, the convention was an initiative of the Magdiwang – Mariano Alvarez (or Jacinto Lumbreras, a Magdiwang) sent the invitations (Alvarez, 104;  Corpuz, 119; Richardson, 324; May, 85) ;

SECOND, Andres Bonifacio chaired the meeting after the convention was opened by Jacinto Lumbreras (Alvarez, 106; Corpuz, 120);

THIRD, Artermio Ricarte, also, a Magdiwang and a close associate of Bonifacio acted as secretary (Alvarez, 107; Corpuz, 120; May, 87);

FOURTH, Ricarte, as secretary distributed the ballots and canvassed the results (Alvarez, 107);

FIFTH, the convention was held at the Hacienda house at Tejeros, San Francisco de Malabon, Cavite, a territory under the control and administration of the Magdiwang (Alvarez, 104; Corpuz, 119; May, 85);

SIXTH, the Magdalos were practically outnumbered in the convention, having sent only 8 delegates, as they were manning the trenches against the Spanish offensive to retake their territory (Ronquillo, 29); and,

SEVENTH, Aguinaldo himself was unable to attend and was voted in absentia (Alvarez, 107; Corpuz, 121; May, 88).

Actually, the claim that there was cheating was a concoction of Bonifacio himself.

On the day of the election, before he and his followers walked out, Bonifacio declared the convention and the elections held null and void on the basis of what he alleged was the failure to abide by the will of the majority.  He was, of course, referring to Daniel Tirona questioning his qualification for the position of Director of Interior.  As chairman of the convention, he could have simply called Tirona out of order and ignored Tirona's motion to elect a new Director of Interior, but instead, he pulled out his revolver and attempted to shoot Tirona, who lost himself among the crowd (Corpuz, 121; Alvarez, 108).  

Then, he changed his position on the following day.  He said, he was cheated, that the election was marred by irregularities.  His allegation was seconded by Artemio Ricarte who claimed in a signed document that some ballots that were distributed were already filled out, glossing over the fact that Ricarte himself was the secretary who was responsible for the distribution of the ballots.   There was also Diego Mojica who told Bonifacio about the filled ballots but Bonifacio simply ignored him (Alvarez, 107).  So, the fair question that might be asked is: whose name was really in the filled ballots assuming that such allegation was truthful, was it, Aguinaldo or Bonifacio?

To formalize his accusation of cheating, Bonifacio caused a document called the "Acta de Tejeros"  to be written and signed by more than forty Magdiwang leaders.  The document was a demand for the resignation of the elected officials of the new government (Richardson, 320-338; May, 98 and 109; Ronquillo, 66; Alvarez, 109).   Then, he called in the head of the Magdalo council to present his demands,  but the Magdalos refused to give in and countered that the elections were conducted in a fair and honest manner and validated by the majority of the delegates who remained after Bonifacio and his followers walked out  (Richardson, 320-338; May, 98 and 109; Ronquillo, 66; Alvarez, 109).

But Bonifacio did not stop there.  He took another step further.  He and the Magdiwang officials together with two of Aguinaldo's generals launched a coup d'etat aimed at unseating all the elected officials by force.  This was formalized in a document called "Acta de Naic" (Ronquillo, 106-109; Richardson, pp. 355-376; Delos Santos, 46-47).  Fortunately, this coup d'etat was nipped in the bud by Aguinaldo himself.  Unfazed by the failure of his null and void declaration and then the two actas Bonifacio organized an opposing army and set up his defenses at Limbon (Ronquillo, 91-92; Alvarez, 117; Corpuz, 124 ).  He also raided the town of Indang to obtain provisions and exchanged fire with government soldiers (Corpuz, 124; Alvarez, 117-118; Kalaw, 5).  This was too much for Aguinaldo, who ordered Bonifacio's arrest.  He was court-martialled, found guilty of treason, and sentenced to death.

Looking back, what could have been the reason why Bonifacio and the Magdiwangs initiated the convention at Tejeros? 

Recall that in the meeting at Balintawak on August 24, 1896, Bonifacio appointed Mariano Alvarez of the Magdiwang council as the overall leader of the combined forces of the Magdiwang and the Magdalo in the province of Cavite (Ronquillo, 138).  However, it came to pass that after the lapse of three months Alvarez had not assumed the position and the two Cavite councils remained independent and continued to operate separately.

And then came the invitation for Bonifacio to visit Cavite.  It was  Alvarez who sent the invitation.  He said he wanted Bonifacio to come to Cavite to see for himself the success of the revolution in the province.  It is important to carefully take cognizance of the purpose of Bonifacio's visit.  Cavite was then a showcase and Bonifacio was to be impressed with its success,  (He was not invited to visit Cavite to mediate between the two councils as claimed by many historians,)  Bonifacio accepted the invitation on condition that he would not stay long and would not interfere with the affairs of the two councils (Alvarez, 86; Corpuz, 96).   But this was not so.  Bonifacio stayed longer than was necessary and interfered with the internal affairs of the two councils.

What could have prompted Bonifacio, to change his plans during his visit?   There is no document or account that explains this change and it can only be surmised.  It is submitted that Bonifacio changed his plans at the prodding of Alvarez who wanted his appointment as head of the combined forces of the Magdiwang-Magdalo councils implemented.  It is very probable that between the two they contrived of the idea of a  convention that will seat Bonifacio as president of a new government at the same time install Alvarez as the head of the combined Magdiwang-Magdalo forces.  They were perhaps too confident that the results of the election would be favorable to them because Bonifacio was still the recognized Supremo of the Katipunan and his election would have definitely favored Alvarez over Aguinaldo's leadership of Cavite. 

Unfortunately, Bonifacio failed to realize that the revolution in Cavite was no longer a monopoly of the Katipunan.  Rather, it was comprised mostly of revolutionaries who were not Katipunan initiates.  Also, Bonifacio must have failed to recognize that his prestige as Supremo of the Katipunan had waned on account of reports of his dismal performance during the August 1896 uprising in Manila.   The Katipuneros who fought with Bonifacio and sought refuge in Cavite with their families helped spread stories about this failed Manila attack.  And it was already known in Cavite that Bonifacio could not be located because he moved from one hiding place to another to evade capture by the Spaniards and had not taken over a town that he could use for his headquarters.   These factors contributed to the erosion of Bonifacio's prestige as a capable leader.  It is not surprising therefore that the Tejeros elections turned against him, which he violently refused to accept.  His defeat and eventual downfall was therefore his own undoing.

SOURCES:

1.  Ronquillo, Carlos: "Ilang Talata Tungkol sa Paghihimagsik Nang 1896-1897", edited by Isagani Medina, UP Press, 1996;

2. Alvarez, Santiago: "Recalling the Revolution", Memoirs of a Filipino General, Translation by Paula Carolina Malay, University of Wisconsin, Center for Southeast Asian Studies, 199;

3. De los Santos, Epifanio: "Andres Bonifacio", Philippine Review, Vol 3 No 1;

4. May, Glenn Anthony: "Inventing a Hero", New Day Publishers, University of
Wisconsin, Center for Southeast Asian Studies, 1996;

5. Corpuz, Onofre D: "Saga and Triumph", University of the Philippines Press,
2002;

6. Richardson, Jim: "The Light of Liberty"; Ateneo de Manila University Press,
2013.

#TUKLAS

Lie No. 1: Aguinaldo had a boundless hunger for power

THE TRUTH: 

President Emilio Aguinaldo had been accused of being power-hungry.  This accusation is being used to fortify his alleged involvement in the death of General Antonio Luna and Supremo Andres Bonifacio, proof, his detractors say, he could not tolerate a potential rival.  

This accusation is baseless and has no truth in it.  The fact is Aguinaldo had exhibited humility and preferred the position of being the head of the military rather than occupy the highest position in the organizations he had been associated with.  Here are some key events of Aguinaldo's career that relate to this issue: 

(1) When the Katipunan Magdalo council of the province of Cavite was established in April 1896, Aguinaldo did not seek the presidency.  His cousin, Baldomero Aguinaldo, took the position of president of the council.  Aguinaldo chose the position of "Teniente Abanderado" (Lieutenant Flag Officer), or the head of the military arm. (Ronquillo, 29 and 137; Alvarez[Recalling],23; Corpuz, 68 and 103)

(2) In December 1896 a meeting was called between the Magdalo and the Magdiwang councils to establish a revolutionary government. (Magdiwang was the other Katipunan council in Cavite, there was a third, Mapagtiis, which merged with the Magdiwang). Aguinaldo suggested Edilberto Evangelista, the engineer who graduated from the University of Ghent in Belgium and builder of the trenches and fortifications in Magdalo occupied towns of Cavite, to run for the presidency, although nothing was accomplished during that meeting due to disruption occasioned by the arrival of Josephine Bracken and Rizal's siblings, Trining and Paciano. (Ronquillo, 29 and 143)

(3) In the Tejeros convention on March 22, 1897, held at San Francisco de Malabon, Aguinaldo did not attend because he preferred to stay on the battlefield in Pasong Santol, Dasmarinas, to make preparations for the impending attack by the Spaniards. Baldomero Aguinaldo was able to send only 8 delegates to the convention (Ronquillo, 29). Although the Magdalos were heavily outnumbered, Aguinaldo was elected in absentia as president, together with Magdiwang candidates who won most of the remaining positions, including the position of Director of Interior, won by Bonifacio.(May, 94-109; Corpuz, 118-123; Alvarez, 104-108; Ronquillo, 70).

(4) When he was fetched to take his oath of office, he refused to leave the battlefield. Only after his brother, Crispulo, volunteered to take his place and vowed to defend Pasong Santol did Aguinaldo reluctantly leave his command. Unfortunately, his brother was killed during the ensuing battle that same day. (Ronquillo, 80)

(5) In mid-December 1898, Aguinaldo resigned his position as president of the First Philippine Republic, saying he was not worthy of the lofty executive office on account of his limited education. His resignation was couched in a form of a request addressed to the Filipino people to give him a special Christmas gift, and that gift was to allow him to retire and let someone else take over his position. He had this resignation printed in a pamphlet of 5,000 copies which he asked the secretary of the cabinet to distribute in all towns. Apolinario Mabini secretly ordered the seizure and burning of all copies and Felipe Buencamino implored Aguinaldo not to let anyone read it because it will cause the death of the revolution. (Saulo[Rewriting], 17; Ronquillo, 70-71)

(6) During the Filipino-American War, while the fighting was raging, the Schurman Peace Commission offered Aguinaldo a yearly bonus of $5,000  and leadership of the Tagalogs and authority to select from his men those who will occupy minor municipal positions, in exchange for the restoration of peace under American administration.  With all the inducements, Aguinaldo rejected the offer and insisted upon immediate self-government. (Van Meter, 151-152)

 In contrast, Bonifacio was the opposite. 

The following events reveal Bonifacio's inclination to gain power, keep it and impose his authority:

(1) Bonifacio maneuvered to expel the first two presidents of the Katipunan - Deodato Arellano and Roman Basa.  He instigated the expulsion of Deodato Arellano, the first president of the Katipunan, who was replaced by Roman Basa. In turn, Basa was similarly expelled and replaced by Bonifacio after the former inquired about the condition of the funds of the Katipunan under the custody of Bonifacio, who was then the Fiscal or Treasurer. (St Clair, 44)

(2) As soon as he arrived in Cavite in December 1896,  he accepted the conferment by the Magdiwang Council of the title "Haring Bayan", or King, with Mariano Alvarez, as "Pangalawang Haring Bayan", or Virrey, or second in command. (Ronquillo, 140; Corpuz, 103)  Bonifacio was already Supremo of the Katipunan.  Why did he accept this new title of "Haring Bayan"?

(3) When he learned of the intention of the Magdalo Council to merge the Magdalo and Magdiwang and replace the Katipunan with a new government, Bonifacio immediately appointed a new set of officers for the merged councils of Cavite with Mariano Alvarez as president and Baldomero Aguinaldo as Vice President.  Aguinaldo was appointed Lieutenant-General reporting to the General-in-Chief, Santiago Alvarez. Aguinaldo asked if the new set of officers is the will of the people and Bonifacio replied that it is not, but it is only his own and added that being Supremo he alone has the authority and he alone must be followed. (Ronquillo, 552)

(4) A day after he lost the elections in Tejeros (March 23,1897), he claimed the election was marred with irregularities and used this accusation to convince the Magdiwang to sign a document called the "Acta de Tejeros" to demand that the elected officials vacate their offices. His demand was flatly rejected on the basis that the election was later confirmed and validated by the delegates after Bonifacio left. ( Ronquillo, 93; Richardson, 320-336)

(5) Failing in his demand, he convinced the Magdiwang and two Magdalo generals that President Aguinaldo was going to surrender the revolution to the Spaniards, and together they launched a coup d'etat on April 19, 1897, to unseat President Emilio Aguinaldo which was formalized in a document called the "Acta de Naic". Unfortunately for Bonifacio, his lie about Aguinaldo's alleged intention was disproved, his co-plotters abandoned him, and the coup was nipped in the bud by Aguinaldo himself. (Delos Santos, 47; Richardson, 355-377; Ronquillo, 106-109) 

In the final analysis, neither of the two is the hero or the villain. Both are great heroes in their unique patriotic achievements. 

Aguinaldo took over the leadership of the revolution against Spain that was started by Bonifacio and succeeded in establishing a republic and self-government after declaring Filipino independence. He defended the first Filipino republic against American annexation and occupation which caused America to spend $400 million, deploy 75,000 troops, suffer 4,000 war casualties, and three years of fighting a brutal war that also exacted 20,000 deaths of Filipino soldiers and over 200,000 civilian casualties. Aguinaldo's undying contribution consisted of two significant legacies – the national anthem and the national flag.

Bonifacio, on the other hand, while he had shown to be too protective of his position as Supremo of the Katipunan, yet he was truly a great hero, not because he led the rebellion against Spain (similar acts of rebellion were led by such men as Francisco Dagohoy, Diego Silang, Leon Kilat, etc. decades before) but rather he was instrumental in awakening the patriotism of the Filipino people using his tremendous organizing talent and mastery of grass-root literary expression. The men who went through the tutelage of Bonifacio (with the help of Emilio Jacinto) – e.g., Licerio Geronimo, Luciano San Miguel, Macario Sakay, and several others - were the ones who formed the backbone of the revolution that spilled all the way through the war against the Americans. They dedicated themselves to the hope of delivering the Filipino people from foreign domination and to the aspiration to be free and independent, unmindful of the catastrophe that could befall them and their loved ones.

 SOURCES: 

1. Alvarez, Santiago V.: “Recalling the Revolution, Memoirs of a Filipino General,” translation by Paula Carolina S. Malay and Introduction by Ruby R. Paredes, published in cooperation with Ateneo de Manila University Press, University of Wisconsin Center for Southeast Asian Studies, 1992

2. Corpuz, Onofre D.: “Saga and Triumph – The Filipino Revolution Against Spain,” University of the Philippines Press and Cavite Historical Society, 2002

3. De los Santos, Epifanio: "Andres Bonifacio," pages 34-58, The Philippine Review (Revista Filipina), G. Nieva: Manila, P.I., January 1918, University of Michigan Library 2005, http://name.umdl.umich.edu/ACP0898.0003.001

4. May, Glenn Anthony: "Inventing a Hero, The Posthumous Re-Creation of Andres Bonifacio", New Day Publishers, University of Wisconsin, Center for Southeast Asian Studies, 1996

5. Richardson, Jim: “The Light of Liberty, Documents and Studies on the Katipunan, 1892-1897,” Ateneo de Manila University Press, 2013

6. Ronquillo, Carlos: "Ilang Talata Tungkol sa Panghihimagsik ng 1896-1897," edited by Isagani Medina, University of the Philippines Press, 1996

7. St. Clair, Francis: “The Katipunan: or, The rise and fall of the Filipino commune,” Manila: Tip. "Amigos del pais,", 1902, University of Michigan Library 2005, http://name.umdl.umich.edu/afj2294.0001.001 

8. Van Meter, H.H., "The Truth About the Philippines", The Liberty League, Chicago, 1900

#TUKLAS

 

Lie No. 08: President Emilio Aguinaldo had Gen. Antonio Luna killed

The TRUTH:

President Emilio Aguinaldo had been the target of the accusation that he was the mastermind in the killing of General Antonio Luna. His detractors claim that he summoned Luna by a telegram to come to Cabanatuan and set him up for the kill by the Kawit soldiers who happen to be his townmates and acting as his presidential guards.  This Machiavellian scheme was allegedly the logical flow of his fear of losing power and authority to a potential rival, in like manner that he allegedly caused the death of another rival, Katipunan Supremo Andres Bonifacio.  Did President Emilio Aguinaldo really have a hand in the killing of General Antonio Luna?

How Luna was Killed

Here is one of several versions of the controversial assassination of General Antonio Luna (note that the date should be June 5, 1899): 

"On June 3, 1899, accompanied by his aide-de-camp, Captain Roman, and an escort, Luna entered the official residence of President Aguinaldo at Cabanatuan (Nueva Ecija). The guard, composed of a company of Cavite men from Cauit (Aguinaldo's native town), under the command of Captain Pedro Janolino, saluted him on his entry. As Luna and Roman ascended the staircase to seek Aguinaldo a revolver shot was heard. Luna rushed down the stairs in a furious rage and insulted Captain Janolino in the presence of his troops. This was too much for Janolino, who drew a dagger and thrust it violently into Luna's head. In the scuffle, Luna was knocked down and shot several times. He was able to reach the roadway, and, after shouting "Cowards!" fell down dead. In the meantime, whilst Captain Roman was running towards a house he was shot dead by a bullet in his breast. The Insurgent Government passed a vote of regret at the occurrence, and the two officers were buried with military honors." (Foreman, 501) 

A certain Arcadio Zialcita, who claimed to have witnessed the killing of General Luna, testified before the Schurman Commission, viz:

Q. Will you be kind enough to give us an account of the killing of General Luna?- A. I told everything that I saw and that I knew about it to a representative of El Progresso. That interview tells all I know.

Q. Will you be kind enough to repeat that for our benefit?- A. I saw his death, but the occasion of his death I only know from rumor.

Q. Where were you?- A. I was in a house where I was waiting, in the plaza, where the convent and the government headquarters and the church are and commanded a view of the whole place. They say that Luna went up to ask for Aguinaldo, with Francisco Ramon, to visit Aguinaldo. Not finding him there he became angry and insulted the guard, and when the guard wanted to seize him and his companion they thought the man was half crazy and immediately began shooting, and the guard, returned the fire.

Q. Did the guard fire on him?- A. All of them. They wanted to take him, but he had saber and revolver to defend himself, and they could not do anything else.

Q. Was he killed by bullets, knives, or bayonets?- A. By knives, and probably by bullet wounds, too, for there were three or four discharges, and so I can not say whether entirely by bolos or bullets.

Q. What was the effect of this killing of General Luna there?- A. I could not say exactly. At first, the people were much surprised, but afterward, they said it was better so because he was very cruel; he killed a great many of his own soldiers, and officers and was a great tyrant.

Q. Aguinaldo did not come back when he heard of the death of Luna?- A. That I could not say, whether he was told of it or whether he returned. I did not see his return up to the time I came away.  (United States[Commission] 1.2:147-148)

Capt. Janolino, the head of the Presidential guards, on his part did not implicate Aguinaldo or anyone for that matter and claimed full responsibility in an interview conducted by Antonio K. Abad in 1929 as it appeared in an article in the Philippines Free Press on April 3, 1954, entitled "More on Luna's Death". (De Viana[I-Stories], 108-109). 

Below is the question and answer as it appeared on the publication above-cited: 

ABAD: Who ordered you to kill Gen, Luna? 

JANOLINO: No one ordered us to kill Gen. Luna. I assume the whole responsibility for the sad happening. 

ABAD: If that is true, why did you treacherously kill the general? 

JANOLINO: The incident was unexpected because when General Luna heard someone fire at the stairs under the convent, he became very furious and rushed downstairs and uttered the following words: “Idiot, fool! You do not know how to handle a rifle!” “We thought at that moment that Gen. Luna would harm us because he was mad and was known to be a very harsh and temperamental man and due to this belief, I was frightened and immediately hit him in the head with my dagger. At that juncture, my soldiers (from the Kawit Company) helped me in attacking him until he rushed out of the convent badly wounded." 

The Alleged Conspiracy to Kill Luna

The story being peddled around is the allegation that Aguinaldo invited Luna to a conference in Cabanatuan and set him up to be killed by Aguinaldo’s men.  The invitation is said to be contained in a telegram dated June 4, 1899, shown in the following facsimile:

This telegram is the object of a much-publicized auction and was billed as the “smoking gun” pointing to the complicity of Aguinaldo in the killing of General Antonio Luna.  The telegram’s supposed authenticity was further bolstered by historian Jim Richardson who presented photos of the entry in the telegraph operator's message logbook, based on the microfilm of the Philippine Insurgents Records.  The coded text is transcribed as follows:

"Folabo puoncimane iun thiundotonade sin ordenar fegmicaen ciusi Esperando contestacion a me telegram anterior en que le pedia piso incupsicaen. Suplico urgencia."

In the catalog that advertised the auction of the telegram the above message was translated and printed to read as follows:

“Paging for an important meeting, therefore you are ordered to come here immediately.  Waiting for a reply to my telegram about urgent matters to discuss.  It is really an emergency.”

Anyone who reads the above message would immediately make the conclusion that indeed  Aguinaldo summoned Luna to Cabanatuan with the intent to entrap him.  But this translation was proven inaccurate and misleading because the correct transcription of the message in Spanish after considering the coding system employed is as follows:

“Felipe Buencamino aun detenido sin ordenar formacion causa.  Esperando contestacion a mi telegrama anterior en que le pedia acusacion.  Suplico urgencia.”

And translates to English as:

“Felipe Buencamino is being detained without ordering the formation of the case.  I am waiting your reply to my previous telegram where I request the basis of your accusation.…”

Nowhere in the telegram does it say Luna is being summoned by Aguinaldo to come to Cabanatuan. According to historian Ambeth Ocampo, in a column in the “Philippines Daily Inquirer” of December 2, 2018, with a subtitle, “The Luna Telegram:  Not so Deadly After All,” the telegram is not a “smoking gun” or the evidence that historians have been looking for all these years.  In other words, there is no truth to the story that Aguinaldo purposely ordered Luna to come to Cabanatuan so that the scheme allegedly concocted to assassinate him is carried out by the Kawit soldiers.  And so the telegram that was supposedly the proof of the alleged complicity of Aguinaldo to the killing of General Antonio Luna is nothing but a farce, a fabrication made up by some quarters in their malicious effort to denigrate the memory of a great man.

Aguinaldo's Version of the Events

Aguinaldo did not ask Luna to come to Cabanatuan. It is the other way around. It was Luna who sent a telegram to Aguinaldo advising him that he (Luna) was coming for a conference. This latest information is based on unpublished notes of Aguinaldo entitled, "Ang Pagkamatay ng Heneral Luna" (The Death of General Luna) which have come up lately. The documents were originally kept by Aguinaldo's secretary, the late Felisa Diokno, and are currently in possession of Ms. Elizabeth Angsioco.  

The unpublished notes say that Aguinaldo received a telegram on June 1 stating that Luna wanted to confer with him.  Aguinaldo already knew from a confidential report of Lt. Col. Pepito Leyba (Aguinaldo[Alaala]) that Luna was planning a "Golpe de Estado"  or coup d'etat and that in his mind the coup would lead to a civil war and he thought it best to avoid Luna and not answer his telegram.

Aguinaldo was wary of Luna's temperament which he personally witnessed during one of the meetings of the cabinet when Luna with half a platoon of soldiers barged in and accused Felipe Buencamino, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, of treason.  Then, after a heated exchange, Luna slapped Buencamino in the presence of Aguinaldo,  thus establishing enmity with the members of the cabinet and Aguinaldo was not happy with it.

Apparently, having learned about the coming of Luna, Buencamino wrote Aguinaldo a long letter the following day, on June 2, 1899  (Taylor 4:101-105),   seeking protection from arbitrary arrest by Luna and expressing fear for his (Buencamino) life because of reports that Luna was angry at those who espoused autonomy (a Filipino government under American protection) with himself, Paterno, the Secretary of  State, Velarde and Arguelles being identified as the principal adherents.  These gentlemen were previously authorized by Aguinaldo to confer with the Americans on the possibility of a settlement of the conflict.  When Luna learned about this he was furious and had the four officials put to jail without any formal charges. Aguinaldo released them but Luna did not like what Aguinaldo did.

So, as far as Aguinaldo was concerned, the telegram he received from Luna was the sign that the coup d'etat would be launched upon his coming to Cabanatuan and he (Aguinaldo) had to do something to prevent the situation from turning into a civil war. As mentioned in the unpublished notes he put on his Captain-General uniform and went to Bamban, Tarlac with General Gregorio del Pilar and took over the command of the Luna's Division from General Venancio Concepcion, who submitted peacefully to his authority.

The relief of General Luna from his command was aimed at preventing the troops from being used by Luna to support the coup d'etat. After successfully breaking up Luna's army into various brigades Aguinaldo sent a telegram to Luna asking him to report to Tarlac, only to learn the following day that Luna had been killed.

Here are excerpts from the transcription by Ms. Elizabeth Angsioco of Aguinaldo's unpublished notes, "Ang Pagkamatay ng Heneral Luna":

"SA PAGKAT, naitaboy na ng Kalabang Americano, sa Kabanatuan, Nueva Ecija ang Presidencia ng Republika Filipina, at sa pangunahing araw ng Junio 1899, ay tumanggap ako ng isang Telegrama ng Heneral Antonio Luna, na makikipanayam lamang sa akin; at sa pagkat dati ko ng alam na isasagawa na nia, sa pagparitong ito ang panukala niang, GOLPE DE ESTADO SA Pamahalaang Republika; at sa pagkat napagalaman ko na nga, na micha o pangdikit na tuloy sa GUERRA CIVIL o Patayan ng magkababayan ang nasabing Golpe de Estado, na mahirap ng mailagan ang kahit ipanganlong (at) sa kababaan ng loob ko rin, ay minarapat ko ng unahin ang pag-ilag o pagiingat at hindi ko na sinagot ang kaniang telegrama; bakit talagang mayroon na siang naituro sa akin, na dapat pag-ingatan ko sia, simula ng kaniang pangahasang ipanghik dito rin sa Presidencia sa Kabanatuan, ang kalahating Pelotong Kawal na kaniang Escolta, at bago ginulo nia ang Pulong ng Gabinete, kahit kaharap ako, at bago pinagtatampal pa nia ang Secretario de Estado Don Felipe Buencamino, dahil sa pagka Autonomista lamang, na hindi nia sinunod ang sigao ko, kundi ng hawakan ko sia; kaya sa halip nga na sagutin ko pa ang nasabing telegrama nia, ay nagbihis at isinuut ko agad ang aking Uniforme sa pagka Kapitan Heneral, na kailan pa man hindi ko pa nagagamit, kundi noon lamang; dahil naman sa paggugunita ko, na baka ako hindi kilalanin, kung humarap ako ng nakapaisano at sa nais kong mabigla at makuyum ko agad ang Kuartel Heneral ng Heneral Luna, sa Bamban, Tarlak, ay umalis ako agad sa Kabanatuan, matapos na mapagtagubilinan ko ang Oficial de Guardia, Kapitan Pedro Janolino, sa Presidencia, “na mag- ingat sa pagtanggap kay Heneral Luna, na sakaling maparito sa ika 5 ng Junio; ay sabihin sa utos ko na ipinagbabawal kong makapagsama pa sia, sa pagpanghik sa Presidencia, sa sino mang Kawal na Escolta nia; at sakaling maanyuan ninyo, na ibig pa niang mangahasa at manampal uli sa sino mang Secretario ng Pamahalaan o sa sino mang Tauhan ng Presidencia ng Republika, ay Arrestuhin agad at alsan ng sandata ang kanyang Escolta.” 

"AT SA AMING PAGKAALIS ng ilang Guardia kong Alabarderos, sa Kabanatuan, ng ika 3 ng Junio, ay tumigil muna kami sa Factoria o San Isidro, dating Cabecera ng Nueva Ecija, at madalian kong ipinahanap ang Columna ng Brigada ng Heneral Gregorio del PIlar, na nabalitaan kong umalis at umilag na maalsan pa sia ng Sandata ng Heneral Luna; at ng dumating ng kinabukasan, ay dalidali kaming umalis at naglakad sa boong magdamag at dumating naman kami ng naninikat na ang araw sa Kuartel Heneral sa Banban, Tarlak. 

"At sa aming pagkadating na yon, ay agad sumaayos ang mga Taliba at mabuti naman ang pagkatanggap sa amin ng Heneral Venancio Concepcion, kahit parang nabigla ito sa amin, agad sumailalim sa aking Kapangyarihan at wala akong nahalatang Kilos hostil. GANITO MAN, at sa pagiingat kong mailagan ang Guerra Civil, ay pinagwatak-watak ko agad ang malaking Columnang ito ng Division Luna sa ibat ibang Brigada. AT BAGO sa araw ding ito, 5 Junio, ay Tinelegramahan ko ang Heneral Antonio Luna, sa Kuartel Heneral nia sa Bayanbang-Bautista, Pangasinan, na humarap agad sa akin, sa Tarlak, Tarlak. Subhali, sa kinabukasan ay tumanggap naman ako ng isang Telegrama ng Gobernador Politico Militar ng Plaza sa Kabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, at ipinagbibigay alam ang sakunang nanyari sa pagkamatay ng Heneral Antonio Luna at ng Coronel Pako Roman." (marked pages 17 and 18, Unpublished notes of Emilio Aguinaldo, originally kept by Felisa Diokno and now in possession of Elizabeth Angsioco) 

And here is the author's translation to English:

As the Presidency of the Philippine Republic had been driven by the enemy – the Americans - to Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, I received during the first days of June the telegram of General Luna that he will come to confer with me; and because I knew that he was set on implementing his proposed Golpe de Estado (or coup d'etat ) against the government of the Republic during the visit; because I know that the coup will lead to a civil war, or a murderous conflict among countrymen, a war that will be difficult to prevent even if it is secretly executed; and because of past experience with the temperamental General Luna, I thought it wise to avoid him and be extra careful and did not answer his telegram; given what he has taught me from past experience here in the office of the presidency in Cabanatuan, from that time when he stormed the meeting of the cabinet with half a platoon of soldiers and disrupted the session and, without regard to my presence, he slapped the Secretary of State, Hon. Felipe Buencamino, simply because he was an autonomist and did not stop in spite of my shouts, and I had to come over to him to restrain him. So, instead of answering his telegram I put on my Captain-General uniform which I have never used because my intention was to make a surprise visit to the Luna Division in Bamban Tarlac and the soldiers may not respect my authority if they see me in civilian clothes. Before I left, I gave instructions to the officer of the guard, Capt. Pedro Janolino, that if General Luna arrives on June 5 he (Janolino) should tell General Luna that he could not bring along any soldier in going up the office of the presidency, and if he senses that General Luna might again harass or slap any of the cabinet members or any employee of the government of the Philippine Republic that he should arrest Luna and disarm his soldiers. 

After I left Cabanatuan with some of the presidential guards on June 3 we made a stopover at Factoria or San Isidro, the old capital of Nueva Ecija and immediately sought the column of the brigade of General Gregorio del Pilar who I learned also left to avoid being disarmed by General Luna; and when they arrived the following day we hurriedly embarked on our journey, walking the whole night, and arrived in Bamban, Tarlac at dawn. The guards immediately lined up in a formation and we were well-received by General Venancio Concepcion who placed himself under my authority, without showing any sign of hostility, although he was somewhat surprised. With my eye on preventing a civil war, I broke up the huge column of General Luna and distributed them into various brigades. And then on this date, June 5, I sent a telegram to General Luna at his headquarters in Bayambang-Bautista, Pangasinan to report to me in Tarlac, Tarlac. However, on the following day, I received a telegram from the politico-military Governor of Plaza in Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, informing me of the accident that caused the death of General Antonio Luna and Colonel Paco Roman. 

The foregoing narration essentially jibes with similar series of events contained in the books of Augusto de Viana, "Stories Barely Told", New Day Publishers, Quezon City, 2013, found on pages 204-206 and Dr. Emmanuel Franco Calairo's "Saloobin", Cavite Historical Society, 2002, in pages 33-35, which must have been provided the authors out of the same sources but it is strange that there are differences in the month and dates of some details. 

Aguinaldo had no Motive to Kill Luna

If Aguinaldo really wanted to kill Luna, it would not be in his residence but on the battlefield and blame it on the Americans. Here is Aguinaldo making this assertion, viz: 

"If I had wanted to have Luna murdered, do you think I would have been foolish enough to have him liquidated right in my headquarters and so draw the public suspicion on me? It was easy to have him killed by the simple expedient of ordering my loyal men to shoot him in the midst of battle and then blame the Americans for his death." (Saulo[Rewriting], 28) 

President Aguinaldo had no motive to kill General Luna.  He gave him a rank in the army over and above the senior officers of the revolution who were uneasy about the appointment, but he insisted and prevailed upon them anyway, some of which were his own relatives. He explained his decision as follows: 

"I took Luna and named him undersecretary of war with the rank of brigadier general because we were short of capable military leaders. Practically all of them had originally recruited their own soldiers from among their tenants and neighbors, and the soldiers often obeyed no one else. While most of our officers were men of intelligence and courage they were generally incapable of large commands. ...Neither, indeed, did Luna go to a military school, for he was a pharmacist by training, but in addition to his undeniable valor, he was an avid student of military theory and history. Not only was he our ablest commander but also he had the foresight and ability to operate a military school with which he trained most of our officers. We needed him to keep our forces as a coordinated unit. And we needed even his terrible temper to impose discipline on our unschooled army." (Saulo[Rewriting], 16) 

An analysis as late as this time of this unfortunate event in our history would bring out these thoughts that boggle the mind: 

1, If Aguinaldo masterminded the killing of Luna, why did he not prepare for it? First, there was no reinforcement of the undermanned guards. He knew that Luna usually traveled with an escort of a cavalry unit although at that time he left them behind before crossing a river. 

2.  Aguinaldo did not send his wife and mother to a safe place. Of course, he would know that the headquarters could turn into a war zone and risk the life of his loved ones and he would not be around to protect them IF he had designs on Luna’s life. 

3.  Luna proceeded to Cabanatuan only with his aide as they went up to the President’s office. This could mean that Luna was expecting to have a one-on-one with Aguinaldo on an important matter. Could it be because he was really the one who sought an audience with Aguinaldo? These actions of both Luna and Aguinaldo clearly prove that there was no premeditation or intent to hurt one another. 

4. Luna's body bore more than forty wounds, an expression of contempt and extreme hatred of those who attacked him, compared to Colonel Roman who was felled by a single bullet to the chest. There is no denying that the Caviteno soldiers hated Luna for a myriad of reasons: they were singled out as the cause of defeat in the battle of Caloocan, their unit was humiliated in front of the troops, and their officers were stripped of their ranks and sent to jail, their brigade was ordered disbanded, and their wives and children were horsewhipped by Luna out of a military train. General Jose Alejandrino, a friend and confidant of Luna who witnessed the horsewhipping incident, said: "I would not be surprised if later some of them took part in the plot in Cabanatuan.". 

5. Janolino and his soldiers appear to have gone unpunished.  However, a court-martial was prepared for them as can be gleaned from the official government report on June 8, 1899, which says:  “...Immediately thereupon the Military Court Martial took the proper steps and is now conducting the preliminary proceedings ...” (Kalaw[politics], 211), but the proceedings were not completed.  And this failure had become a subject of speculation.  Some say it is proof that Aguinaldo was involved because he did not pursue the punishment of the perpetrators. On the other hand, with the full force of the American offensive demolishing every conceivable defense that the Republican Army could muster, gobbling up territory after territory, the exigencies of the war at the time had to be considered. From all indications, however, Janolino and his soldiers were removed from services as members of the Presidential Guards.

6. Dona Trinidad Famy, mother of President Aguinaldo, had no clue on what happened. She was said to have come out of the convent window and shouted: "Why did you kill the General. Didn't you recognize him? You re all bad men." (De Viana[I-Stories], 108-109) 

Conclusion

In any case, what is evidently ignored by critics of Aguinaldo is his frame of mind, his focus while in pursuit of his goal of independence and self-government for the country. Admiral Dewey along with William Bray, Rounseville Wildman, and Felipe Agoncillo had emphasized to Aguinaldo the need to show the world that the Filipinos are civilized and worthy of independence and self-government. This Aguinaldo took to heart, believing in its legitimacy and soundness. In fact, he toed the line as shown by the humane treatment of both the Spanish and American prisoners of war and ordering the stop to summary killings of violators of military edicts that General Luna had formally authorized and pursued. 

Applying this premise in the present case now, it would seem inconceivable that Aguinaldo would have General Luna murdered or even encouraged such murder because that would be anachronistic to the years of sacrifice and the blood spilled in fighting for independence and self-government. The murder of Luna with him as the architect would be taken to mean as an act of savagery. This would have confirmed the allegations by America and the western powers that Filipinos were savages, unable to settle their differences in a civilized manner, and, therefore, were unfit to govern themselves. Surely, Aguinaldo was wiser and would not have crossed the line. 

A coherent pattern is now forming to the effect that those who continue to blame Aguinaldo for the death of General Antonio Luna similarly do so for the death of Andres Bonifacio. Doing so serves their purpose of discrediting Aguinaldo in order that his great contributions to the formation of this nation are not recognized, hence they can, therefore, give the credit to somebody else. 

However, a thorough and objective analysis of existing evidence will lead to the conclusion that General Antonio Luna's death was brought about by his own temper and high-handedness. He incurred numerous enemies among the officers and members of the revolutionary forces especially those who have fought with Gen. Aguinaldo from the start of the revolution. Gen. Emilio Aguinaldo, the favorite whipping boy of those who wants to revise history, was innocent of the crime he is continuously accused of. 

SOURCES:

1. De Viana, Augusto: "The I Stories - The Events in the Philippine Revolution and Filipino American war as told by Eyewitness and Participants," UST Publishing House University of Santo Tomas Espana, Manila, 2006

2. Foreman, John: "The Philippines," Manila, Filipiniana Book Guild, 1980, University of Michigan Library 2005,http://name.umdl.umich.edu/AAQ5315.0001.001

3. Kalaw, Maximo M.: "The development of Philippine politics," Manila: P.I., Oriental commercial company, inc, 1927, University of Michigan Library 2005, http://name.umdl.umich.edu/AFJ2233.0001.001

4. Saulo, Alfredo B.: "Rewriting Philippine History - The Truth About Aguinaldo and other Heroes", Phoenix Publishing House Inc. Quezon City, 1987

5. Taylor, John R..M.: "The Philippine Insurrection Against the United States, a compilation of documents with an introduction by Renato Constantino," Eugenio Lopez Foundation, 5 Volumes, Pasay City, Philippines, 1971;

6. United States Philippine Commission[1899-1900]: "Report of the Philippine Commission to the President.: January 31, 1900," Vol 1, No.2, Washington, Government Printing Office, 1900-1901, University of Michigan Library 2005, http://name.umdl.umich.edu/aex9637.0001.002

#TUKLAS

 

 

Lie No. 3: Aguinaldo wined and dined the Biak-na-bato money in Hong Kong

The TRUTH:

Aguinaldo had been accused of misappropriating the Biak-na-Bato money for himself and his comrades, allegedly indulging themselves luxuriously in their almost five months stay in Hong Kong from January to May 1898. The truth is he deposited the money in two banks and spent only the interest for their upkeep and maintenance. The principal was eventually withdrawn in several tranches to purchase arms and ammunition that were shipped to the Philippines in support of the second phase of the revolution against Spain that commenced upon the return of Aguinaldo from Hongkong on May 19, 1898.

When the Biak-na-Bato peace agreement was concluded on December 19, 1897, Aguinaldo and eighteen of the leaders of the revolution went on exile to Hongkong as provided in the agreement. Aguinaldo’s intentions in agreeing to disarm the revolutionaries and emigrate to Hongkong is not clear but at least his subordinates did not consider the agreement an end to the revolutionary effort. One of Aguinaldo’s subordinates wrote in October 1898 : 

“As I firmly believed that the peace (Biak-na-bato) whose conditions I do not know, was really only a trap planned by you (Aguinaldo) in order to give an opportunity to re-establish your forces which had grown weak enough and then renew your efforts with greater energy and better equipment. I, on my part, did not suspend my labor of favorably disposing the people to that end and of accumulating the means and supplies for hurrying to the insurgent camp at the first opportunity upon the slightest indication from you or from anyone else empowered to speak with authority.” (Taylor 1:432)

Here is a description of how Aguinaldo and his compatriots lived in Hongkong: 

"Aguinaldo received the amount of 400,000 pesos which he deposited in his name in one of the banks, agreeing with his companions not to touch the money and to live during their exile on the private funds which they brought with them and the interests of the money deposited.  He leased a big house where all his companions, together with the families of those who had any, were given the right to free board and lodging.  Malvar, who came later with his family, stayed there.  Those who preferred to live somewhere were given a monthly pension of twelve pesos each.  Almost all were forced to live in the house which they called General Headquarters inasmuch as with twelve pesos monthly, it was completely impossible to pay for board, lodging and laundry, and still buy cigarettes.  Only those who had private income could do so, and these were few.  The monthly pension of twelve pesos was not extended to those of us who were already in Hongkong when they arrived, irrespective of the reason for their stay in the Colony.  However, none of those already in the Colony when they arrived ever intimated their desire to be helped like those who recently arrived.

"...the revolutionists arrived in December, and inasmuch as they lacked clothes and the climate was cold in that island, each was furnished a woolen suit and a cap.  The woolen suit, according to them, had the advantage of protecting them against cold and was more economical as it saved them laundry expenses.  Aguinaldo at that time probably had not completed 30 years of age and the oldest of his comrades, true revolutionists, could not be more than 30 years old; the majority were mere youths ranging from 27 to 18 years of age who came from families that were not well-to-do.  Some belonged to families with properties, but these properties consisted mostly of farms which, as a result of the rebellion, had remained uncultivated, so that it can be said they were in the same economic situation as those without properties, that is to say, they were equally indigent.  Having undergone great hardship and suffered untold privations in the field, it was to be expected that as young men they would like to have some amusements.

"... because I consider that sacrifices suffered in compliance with a duty are the most natural things in the world, but I could not help but admire those young men as I constantly saw them attired in woolen suits, sleeping on the floor, eating miserably, devoid of all forms of recreation, but always contented, buoyant in spirit and resigned.  Esteban de la Rama told me that the unswerving loyalty that he has always shown to Aguinaldo was due to the fact that when he passed through  Hongkong during that period, he saw the miserable existence of those Filipino exiles which Aguinaldo shared with them, despite the fact that the latter had 400,000 pesos in the bank in his name which he could dispose of for his own personal comfort by a stroke of the pen and yet had abstained from doing it." (Alejandrino, 81-83)

"From January 4 to April 4, Aguinaldo withdrew from the banks 5,786.46 pesos in part interest on the money he had deposited. This was used to pay the expenses of himself and his companions in Hongkong. These expenses were kept at a minimum; the money was drawn and spent by him. If one of the men with him needed a new pair of shoes, Aguinaldo paid for them; if another wanted a new coat, Aguinaldo bought it. Minute accounts were kept, which are on file among his papers... Life was not easy under these conditions. Aguinaldo’s companions were entirely dependent upon him. The most trivial expenses had to be approved by him, and he held them down with a strong hand. They were men living in a strange land, among people whose language they did not speak, having nothing to do but quarrel among themselves...” (Taylor, 1:95)

"The dissatisfaction started to manifest itself on December 29, 1897, two days after Aguinaldo's departure. Led by Isabelo Artacho, the rebels at Biak-na-Bato passed a resolution that defied the departed leaders. ... The resolution proposed that the second and third installments, totaling P400,000, be distributed to the neediest insurgents." (Bell, 35 citing Taylor, 1:451-55, extract from PIR 53.3) Accordingly, the second installment of P200,000 received through the representation of Paterno was distributed to the local leaders. When Aguinaldo learned about this he wrote Paterno saying that the money was reserved for the common good and not to be distributed to a few individuals and advised Baldomero Aguinaldo to send the third installment of P200,000 instead to Hong Kong. This was no longer done because the Spaniards reneged on the payment, although Baldomero was able to remit to Hong Kong the amount of P18,582.90 which was added to the bank account. (Bell, 32 citing PIR 54.9)

But Artacho did not stop there. He went to Hong Kong and "... sued for a division of the money among the insurgents according to rank. Aguinaldo refused, claiming that the money was a trust fund, and was to remain on deposit until it was seen whether the Spaniards would carry out their promised reforms, and if they failed to do so, it was to be used to defray the expenses of a new insurrection. " (Philippine Information Society, 2.1:8)

This idea of a trust fund for use in the renewal of the revolution must have been the primary reason why Aguinaldo and the leaders of the revolution agreed to Pedro Paterno’s proposals for a peace pact. Shortly after Paterno arrived in Biak-na-Bato and laid down his proposal for the cessation of hostilities and payment of indemnity an oath was taken on August 27, 1897, signed by the revolutionary leaders, to wit: 

"1. For the increase and strengthening of the resources of the Government we promise to add to the same our private fortunes. 

2. We will also turn over to the Government Treasury all taxes which we may collect in any town or village. 

3. We will not have the power to dispose of said funds without the knowledge and authorization of the President." 

(The oath further provided for punishment to the effect that anyone found violating the oath will give the Government the right to impose a penalty of one or two gunshots in the breast until the violator is dead. (Taylor 1:369))

While the oath did not specifically mention the Biak-na-Bato money expected to be paid by the Spanish government upon conclusion of the peace agreement because of the need to maintain secrecy, especially outside of the circle of the leaders, it is very clear that a trust fund had been established for the benefit of the revolution with Aguinaldo given the sole power to dispose of.

On the advice of Agoncillo, Aguinaldo, quietly left for Singapore together with Gregorio Del Pilar and Leyba to escape the suit. While in Singapore, he was approached by the American consul, Spencer Pratt, offering collaboration with Commodore Dewey. Aguinaldo went back to Hongkong to seek the advice of the Junta. The Junta wanted the American offer of collaboration put in writing but it only received verbal assurance from the American officer in Hong Kong that independence will be respected. After a very spirited debate, the Junta agreed with misgivings to send Aguinaldo home to commence the renewal of the revolution. Accordingly, the American officials coordinated with Dewey the repatriation of Aguinaldo to the Philippines. Meanwhile, the bank deposit was threatened with attachment due to the Artacho suit, so the Junta finally agreed to a settlement for P5,000 to Artacho, refusing his compromise offer of P40,000. (Bell, 44 citing Taylor, 1:515 extract PIR 24.5)  [Upon his return to the Philippines, Artacho was arrested on orders of Aguinaldo and deported to the interior of Cavite. (KalawT[Memoirs], 469)]

"An important aspect of Aguinaldo's preparations for returning to the Philippines was the securing of arms. For this, Aguinaldo depended upon the American consul of Hong Kong, Mr. Wildman, who zealously took charge of the project. The consul was initially given P50,000 for the shipment of arms to the Philippines; before departing, Aguinaldo handed him an additional P67,000 to buy and ship the second consignment. The first shipment of arms, consisting of 2,000 Mauser rifles and 200,000 cartridges, was delivered, but the second - according to Aguinaldo, at least - was never received. "Mr. Wildman did not comply with this last trust, keeping the said sum of money (P67,000), which he refuses to return, according to my advice.''"(Bell, 68-69 citing Taylor, 1:448 extract from Aguinaldo) 

On May 16, 1898, Aguinaldo boarded the American vessel, "McCullough" for his homebound trip. Agoncillo took over the Junta leadership and to Teodoro Sandico was assigned the procurement of arms, while Vito Belarmino, the handling of the funds. "The first arms transaction arranged by Sandico had ended in disaster. He had entrusted nearly P47,000 to an American in Hong Kong for the purchase of arms that were never bought. The money could not be recovered, for such transactions were illegal and the British regarded arms as contraband. Despite the Junta's views, Sandico arranged the second transaction through an intermediary to whom he paid P60,000 for 2,000 rifles and 200,000 rounds of ammunition. The arms were extremely expensive; included in their cost was the price of the transport vessel and a staggering P12,673 commission for the middleman. In June 1898, Sandico sailed with the arms to Cavite ... " and "... succeeded in delivering the arms" (Bell, 82 citing Taylor, 2:488 extract from PIR, 567.11)

"Despite such internal problems, the Junta procured and shipped more arms to the Philippines. Belarmino reported on June 7, that two consignments consisting of 9,000 rifles and 3,000 cartridges were scheduled to reach the Philippines shortly, but two cannon were left behind in the haste to get the shipment underway." (Bell, 82-83 citing Taylor, 3:245 extract from PIR, 1060.5)

"By the middle of June, the Junta's ability to ship arms was severely hampered, this time from an outside source. The Spanish consul, keeping a close watch, protested the action of the Junta to the Hong Kong authorities. This forced the British officials to take action; they subsequently uncovered a cache of arms and ammunition intended for the Philippines"(Bell, 83 citing Taylor, 3:250 extract from PIR 4.7). This violation of British neutrality resulted in a prohibition of Filipino movement to and from the Crown Colony. Even the American consular launch was searched en route to visit vessels in the harbor. Nevertheless, the Hong Kong Junta struggled on. (Bell, 83 citing Taylor, 3:245 extract from PIR 1060.5.).

"In view of the increased vigilance of the British authorities and the difficulty in procuring war materials in Hong Kong, the Junta began to explore other sources of arms. Agoncillo appointed two trusted men, Mariano Ponce and Faustino Lichauco, to go to Japan to ascertain the possibility of enlisting assistance. When the Japanese proved amenable to the idea of selling arms. Ponce and Lichauco made arrangements for the purchase and requested money from the Hong Kong Junta. The original order was for P30,000, which was quickly made available; but the cost of a schooner to transport weapons left only enough money to purchase 1,000 rifles. Since the cost of transportation was fixed, Ponce realized the economy of increasing the size of the shipment and accordingly requested additional funds. Through an oversight, the check which the Junta sent to Japan was not transferable, and could only be cashed in Hong Kong on the due date. The remittance had to be returned and exchanged for cash. In the meantime, the Japanese, who were ready to conclude the transaction, requested P200,000 to be deposited in the Yokohama Specie Bank. Since the Filipinos in Yokohama did not have this sum, they delayed, waiting for the cash to arrive from Hong Kong. Meanwhile, open hostilities had broken out between American and Filipino forces. Thereupon the Japanese, not wishing to be involved, suspended the transaction." (Bell, 83-84 citing Epistola, 30-31.)

"Two more feckless attempts were made to purchase guns from the Japanese. In April 1899, a vessel loaded with arms sank in a typhoon a hundred miles from Shanghai. A second shipment could not be landed in the Philippines due to the vigilance of American coastal patrols, now alert to Filipino attempts to import arms. It was diverted to Formosa and eventually transferred to the Chinese mainland where it fell into the hands of supporters of the Chinese revolutionary, Sun Yat-Sen (Bell, 85 citing Agoncillo, 320; PIR, 399.1; Epistola, 31-32; Alip, 48). Despite its officially neutral policy, Japan did support the Filipino cause. A number of Japanese veterans of the Sino-Japanese War volunteered to fight for the Filipinos; cloth, uniforms, and a few weapons were also obtained. Newspapers and officials were generally in favor of Philippine independence; a few even criticized alleged American imperialism. "(Bell, 85 citing Alip, 33-38).

Upon arrival in Cavite on May 19, 1898, Aguinaldo immediately set to work to organize the revolutionary forces, viz: 

"I promptly gave orders for the distribution of the arms which had just arrived, sending some to various provinces and reserving the remainder for the revolutionaries of Kawit, the latter being smuggled into the district of Alapang during the night of 27th May. The next day (28th May 1898), just when we were distributing arms to the revolutionists of Kawit, in the above-mentioned district a column, composed of over 270 Spanish Naval Infantry, appeared in sight. They were sent out by the Spanish General, Sr. Pena, for the purpose of seizing the said consignment of arms. Then it was that the first engagement of the Revolution of 1898 (which may be rightly styled a continuation of the campaign of 1896-97) took place. The battle raged from 10 a.m. to 3 p.m., when the Spaniards ran out of ammunition and surrendered, with all their arms, to the Filipino Revolutionists, who took their prisoners to Cavite. And so the Revolution progressed, triumph following triumph in quick succession, evidencing the power, resolution and ability of the inhabitants of the Philippines to rid themselves of any foreign yoke and exist as an independent State, as I affirmed to Admiral Dewey and in respect of which he and several American Commanders and officers warmly congratulated me, especially mentioning the undeniable triumphs of the Philippine Army as demonstrated and proved by the great number of prisoners we brought into Cavite from all parts of Luzon. In conformity with my orders issued on the 1st of September, all Philippine vessels hoisted the national flag, the Marines of the Filipino flotilla being the first to execute that order. Our little flotilla consisted of some eight Spanish steam launches (which had been captured) and five vessels of greater dimensions, namely, the Taaleno, Balayan, Taal, Bulusan, and Purisima Concepcion. These vessels were presented to the Philippine Government by their native owners and were converted by us, at our arsenal, into gunboats, 8 and 9-centimeter guns, taken from the sunken Spanish warships, being mounted on board. Ah! what a beautiful, inspiring joyous sight that flag was fluttering in the breeze from the topmasts of our vessels, side by side, as it were, with the ensigns of other and greater nations, among whose mighty warships our little cruisers passed to and fro dipping their colors, the ensign of Liberty and Independence! With what reverence and adoration it was viewed as it suddenly rose in its stately loneliness crowning our victories, and, as it were, smiling approvingly upon the undisciplined Philippine Army in the moment of its triumphs over the regular forces of the Spanish Government! One's heart swells and throbs again with the emotions of extreme delight; the soul is filled with pride, and the goal of patriotism seems well-nigh reached in the midst of such a magnificent spectacle!" (Aguinaldo[Version], 24-26)

In conclusion, Jose Alejandrino, who later joined Aguinaldo in Hong Kong had this say:

“There had not been until now in our history another instance of a man who being in a foreign country and in possession of P400,000 (Mexican dollars) in a bank under his name, the equivalent of more than one million pesos now had the integrity and the unselfishness to return to his country to expose his life for an ideal which is the ideal of his people and his race.” (Alejandrino, 217)

Also, Albert Sonrichsen, an American prisoner of war (POW) who was arrested on January 27, 1899, together with American soldiers dressed in civilian clothes for taking photographs inside Filipino lines, and who was later hired by the Filipinos to teach in a school in Vigan, and had written about the Biak-na-Bato peace agreement said: "The 400,000 pesetas already received remained in a Hong Kong bank and was afterward used to purchase arms and ammunition, but never have I heard any Filipino accuse Aguinaldo of misappropriating one cent of the money." (Philippine Information Society, 1.1:35)

SOURCES: 

Aguinaldo, Emilio: "True Version of the Philippine Revolution," Tarlak, P.I., 1899, University of Michigan Library 2005, http://name.umdl.umich.edu/AFJ2298.0001.0014

2Alejandrino, Jose, “The Price of Freedom” (La Senda del Sacrificio), Episodes and Anecedotes about our Struggle for Freedom, original in Spanish, by General Jose Alejandrino, translated into English by Atty. Jose Alejandrino, prologlue by Teodoro M. Kalaw, Manila, 1949. 

3.      Alip, Eufronio M.: "Philippine-Japanese Relations", Manila: Alip and Sons, Inc., 1959 

4.      Bell, Ronald Kenneth: "The Filipino Junta in Hongkong, 1898-1903: History of a Revolutionary Organization," San Diego State University, 1974 

5.      Corpuz, Onofre D.: “Saga and Triumph – The Filipino Revolution Against Spain,” University of the Philippines Press and Cavite Historical Society, 2002 

6.      Epistola, S. V.: "The Hong Kong Junta," Social Studies Humanities Review, 13 April 1970 

7.      Kalaw, Teodoro M.: "The Memoirs of Felipe G. Calderon," The Phillippine Review (Revista Filipina), Volume 4, No. 1, Nieva, Gregorio, ed. Manila, P.I.: G. Nieva [etc.]; University of Michigan Library 2005, http://name.umdl.umich.edu/acp0898.0004.001 

8.      Philippine Information Society, "The Islands and the People" Boston, Vol. 1, No. 1, May 1, 1901, University of Michigan Library 2005, http://name.umdl.umich.edu/acc6166.0001.001 

9.      Philippine information society, "Philippine Review," [Vol. 2, no. 1], Boston, New York, University of Michigan Library 2005, http://name.umdl.umich.edu/acc5041.0002.001 

10.   Taylor, John R..M.: "The Philippine Insurrection Against the United States, a compilation of documents with introduction by Renato Constantino," Eugenio Lopez Foundation, 5 Volumes, Pasay City, Philippines, 1971;

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Lie No. 2: President Aguinaldo sold the revolution to Spain

The TRUTH:

Not a few uninformed, if not biased, individuals including some historians accuse Aguinaldo of having sold the revolution to Spain. Most likely, these detractors refer to the Biak-na-Bato Peace Pact which was an agreement between the revolutionaries and the Spanish government for the cessation of hostilities, in exchange for the surrender of arms, amnesty to the rebels, and payment of a huge sum of money in favor of the rebels.  The truth is President Aguinaldo and sixty leaders of the revolution met and carefully considered the proposal for a cessation of hostilities in order to have a respite in the fighting and create a war fund, and the Supreme Council of the government at Biak-na-Bato approved it unconditionally.

After President Aguinaldo left Cavite to establish his headquarters at Biak-na-Bato, the focus of the Spaniards shifted from the province of Cavite to the other provinces, with its center in Bulacan.  As General Aguinaldo passed through the rebel zones north of Cavite the local commanders submitted to his authority.  By the time he reached Biak-na-Bato the revolutionists were organized under a single political leadership and military command. After being repulsed in several engagements, more recently his defeat at the battle of Mt. Puray, Governor Primo de Rivera realized the impossibility of crushing the revolution by force of arms. "I can take Biak na Bato", he said to the Spanish Cortes. "Any man can take it. but I cannot answer that I could crush the rebellion." (Gregorio and Sonia Zaide, 118)

 This statement, tantamount to an admission of failure, was not new.  The previous Governor-General, Camilo de Polavieja, who was responsible for Dr. Jose Rizal's execution and for crushing the rebellion in Cavite had warned the Spanish government  before he returned to Spain that: "Cavite is the scandal, but Bulacan is the danger." (Zaide, 155) The Spaniards realized that military options alone to suppress the rebellion would be too costly and results uncertain and decided that a negotiated peace was a more desirable option (Corpuz, 133).

In short, both sides needed the respite from the conflict that was draining them both of lives and resources but both were naturally unwilling to admit their own agendas behind agreeing to the truce. The Filipinos needed the money to purchase modern rifles that would even the odds on the battlefield and the Spaniards needed to show their government that they had successfully quelled the Tagalog Revolt.

Here's how the peace agreement was negotiated and agreed upon.

The initiative for the peace negotiation was undertaken by Pedro Paterno who attended a meeting with the Governor-General at Malacanang on August 1, 1897. His idea of a peace settlement was received favorably by the Governor-General who at once reported it to the Prime Minister of Spain. On August 4, Paterno was issued a pass to cross Spanish lines and he proceeded to Biak-na-Bato arriving at the headquarters of President Emilio Aguinaldo on August 9. (Corpuz, 144)

President Aguinaldo told Paterno that no agreement was possible unless all the leaders of the revolution including those in the field were agreeable. So, Paterno travelled to Morong, Cavite, Laguna, Batangas, Tayabas, Nueva Ecija, Bulacan , Pampanga, Pangasinan, Tarlac, Infanta, Albay and Camarines and met with Vito Belarmino, Pantaleon Garcia, Pascual Alvarez, Doroteo Lopez, Perez Gil Manikis, Salvador Estrella, Mariano Noriel, Artemio Ricarte, Benito Natividad, Esteban Viola, Jose Alejandrino, and Anastacio Francisco. He had to go to Biak-na-bato four times to accomplish his mission (Corpuz, 145).

On September 27, 1897, leaders of the revolution met at Biak-na-Bato and a strange event occurred. An oath was taken by the revolutionary leaders and signed in the presence of President Emilio Aguinaldo, to wit: (1) "For the increase and strengthening of the resources of Government we promise to add to the same our private fortunes", (2) "We will also turn over to the Government Treasury all taxes which we may collect in any town or village", and, (3) "We will not have the power to dispose of said funds without the knowledge and authorization of the President." The document further says that violation of the oath would mean a penalty of one or two gunshots in the breast until the violator is dead. (Taylor, 1:369)

Aguinaldo asserted in his account of the insurrection that there was an agreement drawn up by the insurgents in Biak-na-Bato to the effect that in case the Spaniards did not comply with the stipulations the money paid as an indemnity would not be divided, but would be set aside to purchase arms to renew the war. (Taylor, 1:86) There is no evidence to the effect that such was the agreement among the leaders. However, the above oath gives no other conclusion but the fact that the leaders agreed to create a trust fund, and the money expected from the Spanish government in exchange for the cessation of hostilities would be placed in the fund. While the oath did not specifically mention the Biak-na-Bato money, perhaps due to the need to maintain secrecy, especially outside of the circle of the leaders of the revolution, it is very clear that a trust fund had been established for the benefit of the revolution that could not be touched without the knowledge of and authorization by Aguinaldo.

Apparently, a peace agreement was agreeable to the leaders of the revolution because among the items Taylor had in his Philippine Insurgents Records (PIR) is an undated document entitled "Draft of Agreement of Biak-na-Bato" signed by President Aguinaldo, Llanera, and Mamerto Natividad. (Taylor, 1:359-61; Corpuz, 145)

The inclination of the leaders of the revolution towards peace must have been the result of the recent reversals. Aguinaldo had exhausted his resources during the March and April Spanish offensive to retake the province of Cavite. And now, at Biak-na-Bato, they were left with meager supply to continue fighting, holed up in a secluded area far from the sources of food and other provisions with a reduced fighting force. The leaders of the revolution must have seen the offer of peace as an attractive opportunity to buy time, reorganize and create a war fund. 

In his letter to Ferdinand Blumentritt, General Jose Alejandrino said: 

"In case peace is accepted it will only be for the money involved which we propose to use for the purpose of promoting immediately another decisive revolution." (Alejandrino,78)

Accordingly, On November 15 the formal agreement was signed in Malacanang by Primo de Rivera and Paterno, the latter on behalf of President Aguinaldo under the title "Arbitrator" (Corpuz, 146)

Aguinaldo called a meeting of the leaders of the revolution at Biak-na-Bato on December 14, 1897, about sixty of them all, to confirm their acceptance of the proposal of Paterno and the draft agreement he, Natividad, and Llanera had signed. The leaders gave the Supreme Council the authority to act on the proposal. In the meeting of the council composed of President, Emilio Aguinaldo; Vice-President, Mariano Trias; Secretary of Interior, Isabelo Artacho; Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Antonio Montenegro; of war, Emiliano Riego de Dios; of the Treasury, Baldomero Aguinaldo; Sub-secretary of the Interior, Lino Viola; of war, Vito Belarmino, and of Treasury, Paciano Rizal the peace agreement was approved unconditionally, with objections from Paciano Rizal and Malvar who wished the war should continue. (Taylor, 1:422 and 444)

 The Spanish government committed to pay 1,700,000 Mexican dollars to the revolutionists in consideration for the surrender of arms in exchange for amnesty and the institution of specific reforms. Of the total amount, 400,000 Mexican dollars were paid in Hong Kong to Aguinaldo who went on exile together with eighteen other leaders, and 200,000 to the local leaders who stayed behind. The balance was never paid because both parties repudiated the agreement and the revolution entered a new stage.

President Aguinaldo issued the pacification order on December 16. All but a few like Isidoro Torres (Taylor, 1:417) and Francisco Macabulos obeyed Aguinaldo’s order and surrendered themselves and their men to the Spanish authorities together with their arms. Macabulos eventually surrendered and was included in the distribution of the 2nd installment of 200,000 pesos to various stay-behind leaders of the revolution. Of the 14,000 pesos, he received he distributed 8,000 to his men, and the rest he kept for himself. (Taylor, 1:430)

At past noon on December 25, Aguinaldo and eighteen leaders of the revolution left Biak-na-Bato on their way to Dagupan then to Sual where the steamer "Uranus" was waiting. They boarded at 3 o'clock on December 29, with them were Paterno and Col. Miguel Primo de Rivera, who was acting as security for the personal safety of the exiles and for compliance with the first payment. (Corpuz, 147)

Governor-General Primo de Rivera did not tell the whole truth about the agreement to his superiors. In his December 12, 1897 letter to the President of the Council of Ministers of Spain, he said that the leaders of the revolution offered themselves to surrender with only the condition that their lives be spared and that they should be given means to emigrate (Foreman, 562).

Rivera did not mention, in addition to the commitment to pay war compensation, the specific reforms promised which were itemized in the draft agreement that Aguinaldo, Llanera, and Natividad signed. In the final agreement signed by Rivera and Paterno, as representatives of Aguinaldo, the reference to reforms was not included. (Taylor, 1:359-64 and 1:401-4) It is not known whether or not Paterno was authorized by Aguinaldo to remove the provisions on reforms or he acted on his own without authority. In any case, the peace agreement was a moral victory for President Aguinaldo and the leaders of the revolution because it provided them the respite needed from the exhaustive war, raised for them a war fund, and, in effect a recognition by the Spanish government of the status of belligerency of the revolutionary government and President Aguinaldo being considered an equal in the negotiation for peace despite the efforts of the Spaniards to masquerade the true character of the event.

 In conclusion, an American officer had this to say of the peace agreement: "Instead of dividing the money they had received from General Primo de Rivera among themselves, or paying the indemnity to the families that had suffered, they turned the whole sum into a War Fund for future use." (Blunt, 140)

 SOURCES:

1. Alejandrino, Jose General, "The Price of Freedom" (La Senda del Sacrificio), translated to English by Atty. Jose Alejandrino, Manila, 1949;

2. Bell, Ronald Kenneth: "The Filipino Junta in Hongkong, 1898-1903: History of a Revolutionary Organization", San Diego State University, 1974;

3. Blunt, Captain John Young Mason: "An Army Officer's Philippine Studies", Manila, P.I., University Press, 1912, Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Library 2005, http://name.umdl.umich.edu/AKK9717.0001.001

4. Corpuz, Onofre D.: "Saga and Triumph", University of the Philippines Press, 2002;

5. Foreman, John: "The Philippines", Manila, Filipiniana Book Guild, 1980, Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Library 2005, http://name.umdl.umich.edu/AAQ5315.0001.001

6. Zaide, Gregorio and Sonia: "Philippine History and Government", National Bookstore, 1984); and

7. Zaide, Gregorio: "The Philippine Revolution", The Modern Book Company, Manila, 1968.

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