Lie No. 4: Bonifacio was cheated at the Tejeros elections

THE TRUTH: 

The allegation that Bonifacio was cheated at the Tejeros elections is baseless and has no truth in it.  The fact is Bonifacio lost the presidency and the vice presidency in a succession of nomination and votation and was elected eventually to the lowest position as Director of Interior, very likely,  a product of condescension, or more likely a manifestation of the kind of trust and confidence that the revolutionaries had on their leaders.  Those who were elected for the higher positions had proven themselves in battle and Bonifacio had not.

According to Aguinaldo, 

"...talagang pinaghandaan ang halalang ito sa Tejeros ng mga Magdiwang, dahilan sa ito'y lingid sa kaalaman ng mga Magdalo na noo'y kasalukuyang nakikipaglaban sa Dasmarinas at mga kanugnog. Sila ay walang kamalay-malay sa balak na pag-iisa ng puwersa ng Magdiwang-Magdalo para sa ikatatagumpay ng pakikipaglaban sa mga Kastila sa ilalim ng pamumuno ni Heneral Jose Dominguez Lachambre. Talagang itinaon nina Bonifacio at Ricarte ang petsa ng halalan dahilan sa abalang abala noon ang mga Magdalo sa pakikipaglaban kaya wawalo lamang sa kanila ang nakadalo samantalang "naroon sa teritoryo ng Magdiwang taglay ang kanilang mahigit sa isang daang tauhan nila." (Ronquillo, 29).

(Translation: "...the Magdiwangs really prepared for the Tejeros elections because the Magdalos were not aware of it being too engrossed with fighting at Dasmarinas and adjoining areas.  They did not have any inkling about the plan to unify the forces of Magdiwang-Magdalo for the success of the struggle against the Spaniards under the leadership of General Jose Dominguez Lachambre.  Bonifacio and Ricarte really set the election date at the time when the Magdalos had their hands full in the battle which explains why only eight delegates were able to attend from their group while the Magdiwangs had more than one hundred.)

Note that Bonifacio was not a stranger in Cavite.  His wife, Gregoria de Jesus, is a relative of Mariano  Alvarez, the head of the Katipunan Magdiwang council that controlled half of Cavite.  Bonifacio was also accepted into the fold by being installed as the "Haring Bayan"  of the Magdiwang council, relegating Alvarez, the traditional head, to the position of Virrey, or second in command (Ronquillo,140).

That cheating was a scheme conceived and carried out by the Magdalos to favor Aguinaldo is so fallacious judging from the following facts:  

FIRST, the convention was an initiative of the Magdiwang – Mariano Alvarez (or Jacinto Lumbreras, a Magdiwang) sent the invitations (Alvarez, 104;  Corpuz, 119; Richardson, 324; May, 85) ;

SECOND, Andres Bonifacio chaired the meeting after the convention was opened by Jacinto Lumbreras (Alvarez, 106; Corpuz, 120);

THIRD, Artermio Ricarte, also, a Magdiwang and a close associate of Bonifacio acted as secretary (Alvarez, 107; Corpuz, 120; May, 87);

FOURTH, Ricarte, as secretary distributed the ballots and canvassed the results (Alvarez, 107);

FIFTH, the convention was held at the Hacienda house at Tejeros, San Francisco de Malabon, Cavite, a territory under the control and administration of the Magdiwang (Alvarez, 104; Corpuz, 119; May, 85);

SIXTH, the Magdalos were practically outnumbered in the convention, having sent only 8 delegates, as they were manning the trenches against the Spanish offensive to retake their territory (Ronquillo, 29); and,

SEVENTH, Aguinaldo himself was unable to attend and was voted in absentia (Alvarez, 107; Corpuz, 121; May, 88).

Actually, the claim that there was cheating was a concoction of Bonifacio himself.

On the day of the election, before he and his followers walked out, Bonifacio declared the convention and the elections held null and void on the basis of what he alleged was the failure to abide by the will of the majority.  He was, of course, referring to Daniel Tirona questioning his qualification for the position of Director of Interior.  As chairman of the convention, he could have simply called Tirona out of order and ignored Tirona's motion to elect a new Director of Interior, but instead, he pulled out his revolver and attempted to shoot Tirona, who lost himself among the crowd (Corpuz, 121; Alvarez, 108).  

Then, he changed his position on the following day.  He said, he was cheated, that the election was marred by irregularities.  His allegation was seconded by Artemio Ricarte who claimed in a signed document that some ballots that were distributed were already filled out, glossing over the fact that Ricarte himself was the secretary who was responsible for the distribution of the ballots.   There was also Diego Mojica who told Bonifacio about the filled ballots but Bonifacio simply ignored him (Alvarez, 107).  So, the fair question that might be asked is: whose name was really in the filled ballots assuming that such allegation was truthful, was it, Aguinaldo or Bonifacio?

To formalize his accusation of cheating, Bonifacio caused a document called the "Acta de Tejeros"  to be written and signed by more than forty Magdiwang leaders.  The document was a demand for the resignation of the elected officials of the new government (Richardson, 320-338; May, 98 and 109; Ronquillo, 66; Alvarez, 109).   Then, he called in the head of the Magdalo council to present his demands,  but the Magdalos refused to give in and countered that the elections were conducted in a fair and honest manner and validated by the majority of the delegates who remained after Bonifacio and his followers walked out  (Richardson, 320-338; May, 98 and 109; Ronquillo, 66; Alvarez, 109).

But Bonifacio did not stop there.  He took another step further.  He and the Magdiwang officials together with two of Aguinaldo's generals launched a coup d'etat aimed at unseating all the elected officials by force.  This was formalized in a document called "Acta de Naic" (Ronquillo, 106-109; Richardson, pp. 355-376; Delos Santos, 46-47).  Fortunately, this coup d'etat was nipped in the bud by Aguinaldo himself.  Unfazed by the failure of his null and void declaration and then the two actas Bonifacio organized an opposing army and set up his defenses at Limbon (Ronquillo, 91-92; Alvarez, 117; Corpuz, 124 ).  He also raided the town of Indang to obtain provisions and exchanged fire with government soldiers (Corpuz, 124; Alvarez, 117-118; Kalaw, 5).  This was too much for Aguinaldo, who ordered Bonifacio's arrest.  He was court-martialled, found guilty of treason, and sentenced to death.

Looking back, what could have been the reason why Bonifacio and the Magdiwangs initiated the convention at Tejeros? 

Recall that in the meeting at Balintawak on August 24, 1896, Bonifacio appointed Mariano Alvarez of the Magdiwang council as the overall leader of the combined forces of the Magdiwang and the Magdalo in the province of Cavite (Ronquillo, 138).  However, it came to pass that after the lapse of three months Alvarez had not assumed the position and the two Cavite councils remained independent and continued to operate separately.

And then came the invitation for Bonifacio to visit Cavite.  It was  Alvarez who sent the invitation.  He said he wanted Bonifacio to come to Cavite to see for himself the success of the revolution in the province.  It is important to carefully take cognizance of the purpose of Bonifacio's visit.  Cavite was then a showcase and Bonifacio was to be impressed with its success,  (He was not invited to visit Cavite to mediate between the two councils as claimed by many historians,)  Bonifacio accepted the invitation on condition that he would not stay long and would not interfere with the affairs of the two councils (Alvarez, 86; Corpuz, 96).   But this was not so.  Bonifacio stayed longer than was necessary and interfered with the internal affairs of the two councils.

What could have prompted Bonifacio, to change his plans during his visit?   There is no document or account that explains this change and it can only be surmised.  It is submitted that Bonifacio changed his plans at the prodding of Alvarez who wanted his appointment as head of the combined forces of the Magdiwang-Magdalo councils implemented.  It is very probable that between the two they contrived of the idea of a  convention that will seat Bonifacio as president of a new government at the same time install Alvarez as the head of the combined Magdiwang-Magdalo forces.  They were perhaps too confident that the results of the election would be favorable to them because Bonifacio was still the recognized Supremo of the Katipunan and his election would have definitely favored Alvarez over Aguinaldo's leadership of Cavite. 

Unfortunately, Bonifacio failed to realize that the revolution in Cavite was no longer a monopoly of the Katipunan.  Rather, it was comprised mostly of revolutionaries who were not Katipunan initiates.  Also, Bonifacio must have failed to recognize that his prestige as Supremo of the Katipunan had waned on account of reports of his dismal performance during the August 1896 uprising in Manila.   The Katipuneros who fought with Bonifacio and sought refuge in Cavite with their families helped spread stories about this failed Manila attack.  And it was already known in Cavite that Bonifacio could not be located because he moved from one hiding place to another to evade capture by the Spaniards and had not taken over a town that he could use for his headquarters.   These factors contributed to the erosion of Bonifacio's prestige as a capable leader.  It is not surprising therefore that the Tejeros elections turned against him, which he violently refused to accept.  His defeat and eventual downfall was therefore his own undoing.

SOURCES:

1.  Ronquillo, Carlos: "Ilang Talata Tungkol sa Paghihimagsik Nang 1896-1897", edited by Isagani Medina, UP Press, 1996;

2. Alvarez, Santiago: "Recalling the Revolution", Memoirs of a Filipino General, Translation by Paula Carolina Malay, University of Wisconsin, Center for Southeast Asian Studies, 199;

3. De los Santos, Epifanio: "Andres Bonifacio", Philippine Review, Vol 3 No 1;

4. May, Glenn Anthony: "Inventing a Hero", New Day Publishers, University of
Wisconsin, Center for Southeast Asian Studies, 1996;

5. Corpuz, Onofre D: "Saga and Triumph", University of the Philippines Press,
2002;

6. Richardson, Jim: "The Light of Liberty"; Ateneo de Manila University Press,
2013.

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